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Abstract
This essay argues that modern demagogy can be understood as a symptom 
of a kind of social pathology, combining Wendy Brown’s account of neoliberal 
subjectivity with elements of Robert Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel to do 
so. I begin by focussing on Brown’s contention that neoliberal society has 
bred forms of individual subjectivity that are inherently attuned to right-wing 
rhetoric. Drawing on Pippin’s reading of Hegel, the essay casts these modes of 
individual subjectivity as aspects of a flawed mode of collective subjectivity; 
the contemporary rise of demagogic politics is thereby presented as a symptom 
of a pathological failure of collective self-determinacy, caused by inadequacies 
within the normative structures that articulate social activity.
Key-words: Brown, demagogy, Foucault, Hegel, neoliberalism, Pippin, 
social pathology, subjectivity.
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Resumen
Este ensayo argumenta que la demagogia moderna puede ser entendida 
como un síntoma de una especie de patología social, combinando el relato de 
Wendy Brown sobre la subjetividad neoliberal con elementos de la interpretación 
de Robert Pippin sobre Hegel. Comienzo centrándome en la afirmación 
de Brown de que la sociedad neoliberal ha creado formas de subjetividad 
individual que están en sintonía con la retórica de la derecha. Basándose en 
la lectura de Pippin de Hegel, el ensayo presenta estos modos de subjetividad 
individual como aspectos de un modo defectuoso de subjetividad colectiva. El 
surgimiento contemporáneo de la política demagógica se presenta así como un 
síntoma de un fracaso patológico de la autodeterminación colectiva, causado 
por las insuficiencias dentro de las estructuras normativas que articulan la 
actividad social.
Palabras-clave: Brown, demagogia, Foucault, Hegel, neoliberalismo, 
Pippin, patología social, subjetividad.
Introduction
In a recent article in Critical Times, entitled ‘Neoliberalism’s Frankenstein’, 
Wendy Brown argues that neoliberal social relations have created a monster. 
Building on Foucault’s indications that neoliberalism is not just an economic 
project, but rather “a governing rationality generating distinctive kinds of 
subjects”,2 she contends that neoliberalism’s contemporary formations have 
produced a particularly dangerous kind of subject: a mode of subjectivity that 
has an inherent tendency towards expressing its frustrations in nationalist and 
authoritarian forms, and which is also highly susceptible to manipulation. 
Brown does not define her use of the word “subjectivity”, but it seems clear 
from both how she uses it and from the Foucaultian inspiration of that usage, 
that it is intended to denote the socially informed dispositions of individual 
agents. Her claim is that the advance of neoliberal social projects over the past 
several decades has affected the attitudes, aspirations, and comportment of 
individuals within society.3 The manner in which this has taken place is held 
to stem from the conception of freedom that informs neoliberalism’s general 
rationale (she refers to the latter as “neoliberal reason”4). This is a notion of 
freedom in which liberty is identified with the independence of the private 
individual, and in which perspectives and projects that focus on what she 
2  Brown (2018), 61.
3  See also Brown 2015.
4  Brown (2018), 67.
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refers to as the “social” (e.g. social planning, social provision, social justice, 
etc.) are viewed with scepticism, and even antipathy. The result, she claims, 
is the dispersal, throughout the populace, of subjective dispositions that are 
inclined towards an emphasis on the private and the individual, and wary of the 
potentially domineering effects of the state and social provision; dispositions 
that are thus acclimatised to the break-up and privatisation of social structures, 
and wary of resistance to marketisation. Furthermore, this has also bred a more 
general inclination towards the affirmation of particularity vis a vis universal 
rules and structures: an inclination towards asserting and defending particular 
identities, traditions, beliefs and opinions, and towards rejecting formations 
such as the state, secularity, cosmopolitanism, and – at the extreme – the 
impersonal rulings of science and reason.5 Brown’s central contention, then, is 
that the neoliberal restructuring of society has provided fertile ground for the 
recent popular turn towards the political right.
Although demagogy is not Brown’s primary focus in this text, her 
argument bears directly on questions concerning the contemporary prominence 
and success of demagogic politics. Because the subjectivity that she describes 
is primed to respond to right-wing and nationalist rhetoric, its frustrations can 
be easily channelled through such rhetoric; and when those frustrations are fed 
by socio-economic problems and privations, as is the case today, demagogy 
of this kind can flourish. Furthermore, Brown’s approach also serves to 
highlight an important aspect of modern demagogy: it implies that the latter 
cannot be fully explained by looking solely at the actions and claims of specific 
demagogues, or indeed at the socio-economic conditions and media that have 
driven audiences towards them. Instead, it indicates that the roots of modern 
demagogy need be traced to a more fundamental basis, located in the ways 
in which modern social relations shape individual subjectivities. This entails 
that her essay carries a further implication. Because her account highlights a 
general propensity towards such politics, it is not only relevant to the rise of our 
most prominent modern demagogues: it can also offer a useful perspective on 
related cultural and political phenomena (e.g. the growth of right-wing media 
punditry; the online spread of conspiracy, outrage and misinformation; the rise 
of the so-called ‘alt-right’; the current host of provocateurs, gurus and self-
5  Brown’s remarks can be supplemented here by noting that this emphasis on individual opinion, 
and indeed the skepticism that it engenders towards more substantial truth-claims, accords with some 
of the ambitions of the original neoliberal theorists. According to Hayek, for example, “the case for 
individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of us all” (quoted in 
Mirowski (2013), 78), and on the view that the market can function as “an information processor 
more powerful than any human brain” (Mirowski (2013), 54). Hayek, in other words, was certain 
(contradictorily) that the market is the only source of genuine certainty regarding social policy and 
provision (see Brecher 2019 for commentary on this point). Such a view entails that any presumption 
to be able to ascertain what really is good for ourselves and for society can only seem hubristic, and 
indeed be tantamount to the arbitrary imposition of one subjective viewpoint upon all others.  
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proclaimed ‘outsiders’ who purport to challenge the values of a liberal elite; 
etc.).6 If the term ‘demagogy’ can be understood to encompass such varied 
phenomena – and I would argue that it should indeed be so understood7 – then 
Brown’s approach offers a means of theorising their common basis. This then 
renders it possible to view modern demagogy as a symptom of a kind of social 
pathology, i.e. as a symptom of a flawed set of social relations. My aim in this 
essay is to try to develop that implication, although I shall do so by adopting a 
rather different theoretical framework from Brown’s own. 
I should emphasise that ‘social pathology’ is not a phrase that Brown 
uses (in fact, her caution towards normative evaluations of politics and power 
would entail a degree of distance from the way in which I intend to employ 
the term here). My use of the term is informed by the work of the  prominent 
Hegel commentator Robert Pippin.8 For many years, Pippin has advanced an 
ingenious reinterpretation of Hegel’s philosophy that cuts away the latter’s 
grander metaphysical aspects, and which re-casts many of the elements of 
Hegel’s work that seem hard to sustain today.9 I shall outline this interpretation 
below, but suffice it to say here that it places particular emphasis on Hegel’s 
presentation of reason as a collective and social enterprise. ‘Spirit’, for Pippin, 
is not some kind of animistic cosmic force, as in many traditional readings of 
Hegel: instead, it is simply reason, albeit reason understood as a collective, 
social activity. Importantly for our concerns, Pippin also stresses that the 
operation of such collective rationality is prone to periodic breakdowns and 
crises. In his reading, these breakdowns are caused by failings in the basic 
coherence and unity that a community requires in order to shape and determine 
its affairs freely, self-consciously, and collectively. 
These ideas inform a recent article that Pippin wrote in the wake of the 
Trump election: ‘Hegel on Social Pathology: The Actuality of Unreason’. 
The essay suggests that Hegel’s indications concerning such failings and 
breakdowns could be used to illuminate the “collective irrationality”10 of our 
own contemporary circumstances. With that suggestion in mind, I shall try to 
place Pippin’s notion of social pathology in relation to Brown’s diagnosis. By 
combining the salient elements of their analyses, I hope to arrive at a perspective 
6  Brown clearly has such a broad spectrum of phenomena in mind: two of her essay’s three 
epigraphs concern Marine Le Pen and UKIP, and the third refers to Milo Yiannopoulos.
7  All such phenomena involve the pursuit of political agendas by pandering to the immediacy of 
popular emotion, rather than to rational deliberation. All exploit popular desires, prejudices and fears, 
and set the latter’s energies against the complacencies and ineffectuality of a supposed status quo. 
8  My approach will also differ from that of Axel Honneth, who has become closely associated 
with an overtly normative conception of social pathology. In place of Honneth’s focus on recognition, 
I shall draw on Pippin’s interest in the production, use and contestation of the norms that articulate 
social activity.
9  This interpretation was set out most fully and originally in his Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions 
of Self-Consciousness (Pippin 1989), and has been developed in Pippin’s many subsequent works.
10  Pippin (2017), 350.
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on the social pathology proper to modern neoliberal demagogy. To that end, 
I shall adopt the following approach: where Brown uses Foucault to talk 
about pathological forms of individual subjectivity, I shall draw on elements 
of Hegel’s philosophy, and on Pippin’s interpretation thereof, to propose that 
deeper problems might lie in the form of collective subjectivity that constitutes 
our current social formation. I shall then propose that much modern demagogy 
(broadly construed, as above) can be understood as a symptom of that deeper 
pathology, and thus as an indication of a failure of coherent collective self-
determinacy.
Needless to say, that statement of intent demands an explanation of what 
it might mean to talk about a ‘self-determinate’ ‘collective subject’, and a 
fuller defence of why it might be relevant to do so. I shall try to provide such 
explanations below. They will prove easier, however, if I first describe Brown’s 
claims in a little more detail.
The Neoliberal Frankenstein
As we have seen, Brown’s argument is centred around the conception 
of freedom that she sees as constitutive of “neoliberal rationality”.11 Through 
a discussion of the ideas of Friedrich Hayek – one of the chief architects of 
modern neoliberalism – she contends that this is a view in which freedom is 
essentially understood in terms of the absence of restrictions, and in which the 
individual agent is absolutely primary. The best way to avoid such restrictions, 
according to Hayek, and to thereby maximise individual freedom, is to organise 
society on the basis of market principles. This is because doing so would 
entail prioritising individual choice. The social programme that follows from 
these views is one in which the private sphere should be expanded and left 
as unregulated as possible, and in which the social (the shared, collectively 
managed, and state-organised elements of society) should be progressively 
restricted and privatised. 
 According to Brown, the resultant neoliberal drive towards the 
expansion of the private, and towards the concomitant restriction of the 
social, has been pursued to such an extreme degree that the private has now 
virtually swallowed the social. This has given rise to what she describes as a 
“new ethos of the nation”,12 insofar as a “public, pluralistic, secular democratic 
national imaginary” has been steadily replaced with what she calls a “private, 
homogenous, familial one.”13 Her argument here is that, because the private 
11  Brown (2018), 61.
12  Brown (2018), 65-6.
13  Brown (2018), 65-6.
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and the familial have practically encompassed the social, the nation as a whole 
has become reconceived in the popular “imaginary” as a peculiar hybrid of 
business and home. Just as a domestic home is a private sphere characterised 
by distinct traditions, customs, characteristics, and attitudes – a space that 
ought to be kept distinct from external, universalising impositions – so too is 
the national ‘home’ conceived, in this “imaginary”, as a space characterised 
by distinct traditions, cultural identities and beliefs. Such a space is thus in 
need of protection from abstract, transnational entities and values, and from 
threatening invaders and freeloaders. Moreover, just as a business requires 
strong, decisive management, able to make ‘good deals’, so too is the nation in 
need of a leadership able to operate as just such an executive. This dual notion 
of the private – both business and home at one and the same time – lends itself 
to support for authoritarian, pro-capitalist nationalism.14 
This inclination is compounded by a tendency towards irrationality on 
the part of individual subjects (although I should add that ‘irrationality’ is my 
term, not hers). Brown argues that the identification of freedom with the private 
entails the prioritisation and affirmation of individual, independent belief. The 
attitudes fostered by neoliberalism thus invite the elevation of personal opinions 
and faiths over the more universal and impersonal rules of reason and science. 
When this is coupled to the tendency towards authoritarian nationalism outlined 
above, it renders those whose ‘subjectivities’ have been shaped in this manner 
prone to manipulation and influence by “plutocrats, Right-wing politicians, and 
tabloid media moguls”.15
Yet as Brown acknowledges, all this is not enough, on its own, to explain 
the appetite for right-wing demagogy that characterises our contemporary 
context. As she puts it: “Neoliberal reason by itself … does not generate 
nationalist movements hell-bent on whitening nations, walling out immigrants 
and refugees, or vilifying feminists, queers, liberals, leftists, intellectuals, and 
even mainstream journalists.”16 This requires a change in material conditions, 
capable of generating frustrations that can be readily articulated in this manner. 
This, according to Brown, has been provided by international and domestic 
economic shifts that have worsened the status and conditions of the “white 
working and middle class inhabitants” of the “Euro-Atlantic”.17 Owing to a 
combination of post- financial crisis austerity, growing inequality, and changes 
in the global flows of capital, trade and manufacture, these individuals are now 
facing diminishing socio-economic status, growing insecurity, and declining 
access to “decent incomes, housing, schools, pensions, and futures”.18 When 
14  See Nicola Clewer’s essay in this volume.
15  Brown (2018), 75.
16  Brown (2018), 68.
17  Brown (2018), 61.
18  Brown (2018), 61.
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channelled through the ‘ethos’ and subjectivity outlined above, Brown argues, 
the resulting disaffections can easily slip into resentment towards job-stealing 
foreigners (understood as dangers from ‘outside’), threats to patriarchal, moral 
and religious traditions (understood as impositions upon ‘private’ custom), and 
towards a detached, condescending, ‘politically correct’ liberal elite (associated 
with the universalising dictates of the social). “Et voilà”, she writes: “twenty-
first century authoritarianism in freedom’s name!”19
This then brings us to the ‘Frankenstein’ metaphor invoked by the title of 
Brown’s essay. Where Mary Shelley’s hapless doctor unwittingly fashioned 
a monster through the pursuit of science, the concerns with freedom that 
motivated the original neoliberal theorists have, for Brown, produced a 
similarly destructive outcast; and just as Victor Frankenstein sought to create a 
figure of reason and beauty, but instead produced a wounded monster, so too, 
for Brown, have the neoliberals created an entity that differs sharply from their 
intentions.20 “Far from the calculating, entrepreneurial, moral and disciplined 
being imagined by Hayek and his intellectual kin,” she writes, “this one is 
angry, immoral and impetuous, spurred by unavowed humiliation and thirst for 
revenge”.21
I shall return to the issues raised by this metaphor below, because it is surely 
one of the most questionable aspects of her entire essay (casting great swathes 
of the aggrieved working class as a ‘monster’ is redolent, to say the very least, 
of the liberal elitism that this same subjectivity has turned against). But to sum 
up at this point: Brown’s analysis locates the roots of far-right populism, and 
thereby those of the demagogic politics that the latter feeds, within a form of 
subjectivity that stems from the social relations that compose modern society. 
Now, if this account can be taken to identify a kind of social pathology, as 
I proposed at the outset of this essay, then how might we characterise that 
sickness? 
The universal and the particular 
Brown’s diagnosis amounts to an identification of a pathological mode 
of prioritising the particular over the universal. If we follow the steps of 
her argument, the progress of the disease would seem to work as follows. 
19  Brown (2018), 68.
20  As Mirowski points out, ‘the starting point for neoliberalism is the admission … that the 
conditions for its existence must be constructed, and will not come about “naturally” in the absence of 
concerted political effort and organisation’ (Mirowski (2013), 53n). The neoliberal dissolution of ‘the 
social’, to use Brown’s term, was thus a deliberate, and highly successful, project. Her Frankenstein 
metaphor is certainly problematic, but it is also apt, insofar as the neoliberal restructuring of society 
necessarily entailed the re-shaping of beliefs, aspirations, and modes of comportment.
21  Brown (2018), 78.
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(1) Firstly, neoliberal policies undermine the social in favour of the private, 
producing subjects inclined towards affirming individual freedom, and towards 
rejecting universalising impositions. (2) This inclination is then fed by forms 
of demagogy, which help to channel socio-economic frustrations into demands 
for the defence of individual freedom. The latter is, in consequence, seen to be 
threatened by attacks upon the status of particular identities, beliefs, traditions, 
and forms of individual agency. (3) This then prompts further, defiantly 
aggressive, affirmations of particularity: hence the angry contemporary 
endorsements of nationalism in response to the abstract universality of 
‘globalism’; of ethnicity and tradition against cosmopolitanism; of customary 
gender roles against the supposed dictates of ‘political correctness’, feminism 
and equality; and of individual faith vis a vis science and reason (this list could, 
of course, continue).
If this analysis of our contemporary situation is broadly correct – and in my 
view, it seems perceptive, at least as regards the political culture of the modern 
West – then what would be the relevance of adopting the more Hegelian stance 
to which I referred earlier? In what way might it be able to supplement Brown’s 
analysis?
The point is that Hegel’s philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the 
relation between universality and particularity. The details of that concern form 
the heart of his complex metaphysics, which cannot be addressed here, but 
the general theme of his ambitions in this regard can be introduced by simply 
noting that his work is not the imperialistic, domineering logic of legend. One 
of the primary charges that is often levelled against Hegel’s philosophy is that 
it suppresses all particular differences and identities under the totalising rule of 
a universal identity. The infamous Hegelian ‘Absolute’, on this view, becomes 
a kind of ultimate, catch-all transcendental category, which Hegel and his 
followers have rudely and forcibly hammered down onto the subtle distinctions 
and variations of the historical world (Hegel’s metaphysics, on this view, offers 
a perfect example of the kind of imposition that neoliberal thought allegedly 
seeks to avoid).22 Yet Hegel was explicitly opposed to any such enterprise, 
and instead set out to conceive a kind of immanent, organic and harmonious 
relation between the universal and the particular, and thus between identity and 
difference. To quote the Logic: his aim was to set out a kind of thought in which 
“the universal … takes its other within its embrace, but without doing violence 
to it”, insofar as it is, “in its other, in peaceful communion with itself”.23 This 
concern is also evident in Hegel’s social and political philosophy, where he 
argues for a mode of organisation in which the universal structure of the social 
whole is not imposed upon, but rather arises from, the particular individuals 
22  See Stewart (1996) for useful responses to this view.
23  Hegel (1969), 603.
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from whose activity it emerges.24 Such a perspective entails finding fault in 
social formations in which the universality of the state functions as an alien 
imposition on the individuals concerned; in formations that are marked by 
clashing, fragmented, factional elements; or in social structures that amount to 
aggregations of atomised individuals. 
 There is, of course, a great deal more to be said here, but I hope 
that these remarks serve to at least indicate the relevance of Hegel’s ideas to 
the pathological prioritisation of the particular, and to the denigration of the 
universal, that I highlighted in Brown’s account of neoliberal capitalism. As 
I shall now try to show, this then means that that pathology can be construed, 
following Pippin, as a set of failures in a mode of collective subjectivity. In 
order to develop that claim, however, I must first set out some general remarks 
about Hegel’s understanding of subjectivity.
Collective subjectivity
The issues involved here are very complex and technical, so I hope that 
I can be forgiven for painting them in rather broad brushstrokes. But to put 
it very simply and abruptly: a ‘subject’, for Hegel, is an entity that generates 
differentiation within itself; maintains and develops its identity throughout 
those differentiations; and possesses a degree of self-awareness. Individual 
human agents are ‘subjects’ in this Hegelian sense: one might think here of 
the emergence of distinct mental states within the apperceptive unity of a 
single human mind, or of the different actions and experiences that make up 
the moments of a single human life. These particular moments emerge within, 
and both give rise to and form part of, a universal whole. Hegel also uses this 
idea to think about the unity and persistence of a distinct community through 
time. As a collective ‘subject’, that community has an identity that arises from, 
and which is sustained throughout, the differences that emerge within it, i.e. 
from the different lives, actions, and interactions that compose the ‘life’ of that 
community. This is central to Pippin’s understanding of Spirit (or, to be precise: 
to Pippin’s understanding of what Hegel calls “objective Spirit”).25 
In a traditional reading of Hegel, Spirit is typically understood as the 
vehicle through which a grand, quasi-pantheistic reason slowly ascends 
towards full realisation and self-awareness. Pippin’s reading is shorn of any 
such cosmic monism. It presents reason solely as the shared system of concepts, 
24  Hegel’s view that such a state of affairs could be achieved in a highly patriarchal constitutional 
monarchy (see Hegel 2005) is a classic example of the obvious tension between the potentially 
radical content of his philosophy and its conservative pronouncements. See Clark (2013), 65-8 for an 
argument that holds that this same tension can be identified within Pippin’s work.
25  Pippin (2017), 335. 
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norms and practices that articulates the operation of a collective subject. So, to 
put it rather reductively: Spirit, for Pippin, is a collective subject;26 reason is 
the shared, collective means by which the actors who compose that subject 
understand themselves and their world. Reason, in other words, affords the 
shared commitments, practices, patterns of behaviour and history, etc., that 
mediate the actions and interactions of the collective’s members, and which 
thereby give rise to a particular mode of social life. 
This entails that such a collective subject can be understood (to quote one 
of Hegel’s most famous descriptions of Spirit) as both an “I that is we”, and 
a “we that is I”.27 That formulation does not denote totalitarian uniformity. 
Instead, and to borrow Pippin’s phrasing, it simply means that ‘while any 
individual I comes to be the I it is and maintains its sense of itself within a 
common mindedness, it is also the case that this common mindedness is only 
possible by the attitudes and commitments of distinct, individual “I’s”’. The 
commonality afforded by the social operation of reason thus amounts to a kind 
of shared self-awareness, articulated by the “shared beliefs, attitudes [and] 
dispositions that the sharing members know are shared”.28 So Hegel is not 
describing a mode of subordinating particular individualities under the rubric 
of a single, monolithic, group identity: instead, this commonality is a medium, 
composed of shared values, norms, attitudes and practices, within and through 
which such individualities can emerge, persist, and interact as elements of a 
whole. There is a great deal more to be said here concerning the nature of 
these shared norms and practices, and indeed concerning Pippin’s claim that 
they change, develop and collapse over time. I shall return to some of these 
details later. Here, however, I want just to underscore the following two points. 
Firstly, collective subjectivity, understood in these terms, is a structure that 
enables collective self-determination; and secondly, this structure, and the self-
determinacy that it affords, stems from the interrelation of the universal (shared 
norms and practices) and the particular (individual agents who interact through 
those shared norms). A pathological failure of such interrelation would thus 
weaken, undermine, and perhaps even thwart such collective self-determinacy. 
This brings us back to Brown’s claims.
I argued above that the problems that Brown identifies follow from a 
denigration of the social vis a vis the individual that could be understood as 
a flawed relation between the universal and the particular. If we look at that 
diagnosis through the lens of the Hegelian ideas that I have outlined here, 
Brown’s account of pathological forms of individual subjectivity could be 
construed as pointing towards the deeper problem of collective subjectivity. 
26  Pippin (2017), 335; for a slightly contrasting view see Inwood (2003), 280-3. 
27  Hegel (1977), 110.
28  Pippin (2017), 334.
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Seen in these terms, the story would run as follows: the neoliberal privatisation 
of the social lends itself to the latter’s dissolution; this produces the toxic 
individual subjectivities with which Brown is concerned, but it also breeds 
the breakdown of the kinds of social mediation and coherence required for 
collective self-determinacy (one could propose a reciprocal relation here, 
wherein the privatisation of the social generates subjective dispositions that 
then exacerbate social fragmentation). Remaining within the ambit of Brown’s 
claims, we could then contend that the particularistic confusion of nation, home 
and business described earlier, and the concomitant prioritisation of particular 
beliefs vis a vis facts and established discourses, give rise to the factional 
fragmentation proper to our purportedly ‘post-truth’ circumstances. Such 
confusion would amount to a pathological failure or weakening of collective 
self-determinacy.
These ideas could also help us to go somewhat further than Brown in 
thinking about the roots of modern demagogic politics. For according to the 
perspective outlined here, failures in the mediating structures and norms that 
articulate social activity foster separation, oppositional group identities, and a 
general loss of orientation and direction. They should be expected, therefore, to 
give rise to, and to be furthered by, forms of demagogy that purport to express 
the conflicting demands and identifications that result from such a loss of unity. 
The monstrosity of an absent subject
Importantly, this approach offers a means of remedying an important 
shortcoming in Brown’s account. Brown’s Frankenstein metaphor places her 
essay very close to a problem that runs throughout a good deal of contemporary 
commentary on populist politics: namely, a kind of horrified reification of the 
working class, in which the latter are confusedly and reductively identified with 
factional characteristics (e.g. white, nationalist, chauvinist, etc.) that stem from 
the demagogic manipulation of social grievances.29 The manner in which this 
plays out in Brown’s essay seems to derive from the way in which she employs 
Foucault’s ideas. 
As we have seen, Brown’s Foucaultian version of subjectivity concerns 
the dispositions and comportment of individual agents. By describing a broad 
demographic under this rubric, she comes extremely close to characterising 
that entire demographic. And this amounts to a reification of the latter, because 
this characterisation involves treating the political actions of such individuals 
as indicative expressions of their nature (or, rather, of their ‘subjectivity’, in 
the Foucaultian sense of that term). Consequently, and inadvertently, Brown 
29  These claims are informed by Alberto Toscano’s ‘Notes on Late Fascism’ (Toscano 2017).
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ends up presenting an account of a collective agent of some kind: a unitary 
whole that possesses a distinct and relatively uniform character and mode 
of comportment. The problem, of course, is that this obscures the sense in 
which the forms of popular politics with which she is concerned are not the 
expressions of a coherent class subject, possessed of some kind of distinct 
collective orientation. Instead, they are symptomatic of the absence, or at least 
of the denigration, of any such collective agency. 
Surely one of the primary aspects of the contemporary situation is that it is 
not marked by unified individuals, operating as a whole, but rather by masses 
of individuals, who, in the absence of such orientation, feel all the more acutely 
the attraction of the answers, sureties and direction proffered by demagogic 
figures and cultural phenomena. This desire for certainty and direction pertains, 
I think, to the enormous contemporary success of demagogic gurus (such as 
Jordan Peterson,30 whose best-selling conservative self-help book is even 
subtitled “An Antidote to Chaos”31) and conspiracy theorists (Alex Jones, for 
example);32 to the sense of righteous indignation afforded by aligning oneself 
with free-speech ‘martyrs’ (e.g. Tommy Robinson33 and others); or indeed 
to the darkly euphoric sense of belonging that comes from horrifying the 
liberal sensibilities of a stagnant status quo (Milo Yiannopoulos,34 the online 
manifestations of the ‘alt-right’,35 and, in a much weaker sense, the Trump 
election and the Brexit referendum). My suggestion here is simply that the 
appeal of the sense of identity, meaning and direction offered by all such 
demagogic narratives stems from the fragmentation and confusion proper to a 
pathological form of collective subjectivity. Or, to put that much more bluntly: 
people are drawn to demagogic images of meaning, direction and belonging, 
due to the impoverishment of more concrete forms of collective orientation 
(i.e. due to a pathology of collective subjectivity, in the sense described above).
30  Peterson is a Canadian psychologist and social commentator who has risen to fame over the past 
several years due to the tremendous success of his 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos (Peterson 
2018), and the prominence of his videos on Youtube. Peterson is able to combine accessible, and at 
times insightful, critical observations about modern society with comfortingly familiar ideological 
tropes concerning the merits of tradition and patriarchal values. His work is thus particularly suited 
towards articulating and framing the frustrations of young, white, men, whose position in society has 
been eroded by post-financial crisis neoliberalism. 
31  Peterson (2018).
32  Jones is a prominent American conspiracy theorist whose website and radio show advance a 
peculiarly furious and paranoid version of libertarianism. 
33  Robinson, whose real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, is a British far-right activist. He was a 
member of the British National Party (a far-right political party); he co-founded the English Defence 
League (an anti-Islamic organisation); and he is currently an advisor to the U.K. Independence Party. 
Much of his current prominence stems from his success in presenting himself as a proponent of free 
speech who has been silenced by a politically correct elite.
34  Yiannopoulos is an internet celebrity who has created his fame through advancing deliberately 
controversial, provocative, and offensive views. He was an editor of Breitbart News, is associated 
with the alt-right, and, like Robinson, has been able to position himself as a free-speech ‘martyr’.
35  See Nagle (2017) for useful commentary on this phenomenon.
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This is not to deny that Brown’s account accommodates some of these 
issues, but she does so less explicitly, and in rather different terms. As we shall 
see shortly, her notion of subjectivity is able to address the sense in which 
modern unrest is not just motivated by forms of material privation, but also by 
the existential impoverishment described here. By the latter term, I mean to 
denote the sense of futility that follows, for large sections of the populace, from 
a lifetime of debt, pointless jobs, and inaccessible social goods: a malaise that is 
only exacerbated, in however diffuse a manner, by the ecological and economic 
problems that loom on the collective horizon. The resentments proper to such 
existential impoverishment – a poverty that really arises, according to the view 
that I have proposed here, from a loss of collective self-determinacy – can only 
exacerbate the appeal of demagogic answers. Brown touches on such issues, 
but her lack of a notion of collective subjectivity limits the purchase of her 
account. This limitation could be addressed, I think, by drawing on aspects of 
Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel. To that end, we now need to look at some of 
the details of his claims.36 
Pippin’s Hegel
As we saw earlier, Pippin’s interpretation avoids the quasi-pantheistic 
dimensions of Hegel’s metaphysics. It does so by re-casting the latter in 
broadly Kantian terms. Hegel is traditionally understood to have claimed that 
all being (i.e. the cosmos itself) is conceptually structured. In contrast, Pippin’s 
Hegel advances a more modest contention: for this Hegel, it is not being per 
se that is conceptually structured, but rather all intelligible being (i.e. all that 
being could ever intelligibly be for us).37 This is because, for Pippin’s Hegel, 
our understanding of the world is generated by the concepts that allow us to 
conceive an objective reality. As in Kant, our use of these concepts is governed 
by normative rules. Such normative concept-use articulates the operation of the 
collective subjectivity that I described above, and it affords the shared modes of 
recognition, activity, and intelligible agency that that operation requires. 
Crucially, those shared patterns of norm-based activity and sense-making 
are also held to be subject to change. Pippin’s claim here is that, through 
social activity and interaction, we generate, employ, contest, and reformulate 
the shared norms through which we render our environment and actions 
mutually intelligible (e.g. the acknowledged meaning of a particular object, 
the significance and appropriateness of a kind of activity, etc.). This entails 
36  I am indebted to Robb Dunphy for his help with some of the more obscure elements of Pippin’s 
reading of Hegel. 
37  Pippin (2005), 49.
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different modes of cultural practice, and thus different instantiations of ‘Spirit’, 
but as in Hegel himself, it does not involve complete relativism. 
In Pippin’s reading, the structure of collective subjectivity – a structure that 
depends upon mutual recognition and the mutual comprehension of particular 
subjects and objects via universal norms – is not simply given to us. The rules 
and concepts that articulate the way we think and act are not derived empirically, 
or drawn from any external, transcendental source.38 Instead, they are held to 
be have been generated from, and revised through, the course of social activity. 
This means that, for Pippin’s Hegel, collective subjectivity is an achievement,39 
not a given, and something that can be done well, or badly. Success in this 
regard is tantamount to the degree to which a structure of collective subjectivity 
affords the free agency of the individuals who compose it. 
Unlike Hayek – and indeed unlike much of the liberal tradition40 – Hegel 
does not conceive freedom as the absence of impositions upon individual liberty. 
Instead, freedom, for Hegel, is a necessarily collective condition (“I am only 
truly free”, he writes, “when the other is also free”).41 In Pippin’s interpretation, 
this follows from the relation between a) the social operation of reason, and b) 
individual agency. The key idea here is that my actions are only really mine 
when I can justify and explain them. This requires mutual recognition, common 
norms of practical rationality, and shared conceptual structures. Without those 
requirements, my actions cannot be recognised, understood, and credited as my 
own by others. As Pippin puts it: “for the action to count as mine, it must make 
a certain kind of sense to the agent, and that means it must fit in intelligibly 
with a whole complex of practices and institutions within which doing this now 
could have a coherent meaning”.42 This then means that the freedom of one 
individual (qua a rational agent able to offer and identify reasons for actions) 
is dependent upon the freedom of others (i.e. upon the shared, social nature of 
such normative reasons, and upon the availability and intelligibility of those 
reasons to other such agents). Neither mutual recognition nor these shared 
complexes of norms are automatically given to us. Instead, they arise from the 
agreements, conflicts, dilemmas, and disputes over meaning that surround our 
actions. Consequently, freedom, as I indicated earlier, is an achievement on this 
view, and something that a society can attain with varying degrees of success.
This then brings us to the following, key point. For Pippin, “one of 
the most interesting aspects of such a social condition” – i.e. the condition 
of shared norm-based interaction outlined here, and thus that of the “shared 
38  “…[T]here is no external or autonomous philosophic standpoint from which a critical assessment 
of possible claims to know could go on, no ‘bar of reason’, above the fray [of Spiritual life], to which 
candidate accounts could be brought for hearing” (Pippin (2007), 60). 
39  Pippin (2008), 9.
40  Houlgate (2005), 183-4.
41  Quoted in Chitty (2013), 687/
42  Pippin (2008), 5, emphasis in the original.
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meaningfulness, or intelligibility”, that affords rational activity – is that “it can 
fail, go dead [or] lose its grip”.43 ‘Failure’, in this sense, means an inability 
to afford coherent rational self-determination. The complexes of norms that 
articulate the operation of a community can fracture, and elements thereof 
can collapse. If that occurs, the common-mindedness required for collective 
freedom is undermined. 
Such a situation could arise because the norms involved might be in 
contradiction (to use one of Pippin’s examples: a commitment to equality 
before the law may be incompatible with a commitment to a justice system 
that rewards privilege).44 Some norms would then require of the agent “further 
commitments incompatible with others necessary within some form of 
life”,45 thus weakening the cohesion of the whole. Or, one might find oneself 
“confronted”, as Pippin puts it, “by possibilities of work … or political choices 
that are not experienced as possible expressions of one’s own commitments”,46 
because the institutions and customs involved may have started to seem hollow 
to the actors involved. Reasons may well be available for my actions (e.g. the 
expectations of others, the pursuit of money, etc.), but they may ring false when 
called upon to serve as my reasons. If that occurs, Pippin writes, we would “not 
want to say that the action is truly ‘mine’, such that I can fully or truly stand 
behind it, own up to it, claim ownership of it”.47 In a more extreme case, the 
activities in question may even be “part of a [social] practice that has … gone 
dead in a certain way”.48 If my actions involve jarring commitments; if they 
do not make sense to me; or if they simply do not make sense to others, as 
elements of a network of recognised practices and institutions; then they cannot 
be instances of the collective rational agency of a social whole. 
As I hope is already apparent, the ideas sketched here can be readily 
applied to contemporary phenomena. They can be used to explain, for example, 
the current profusion of wat David Graeber has aptly termed “bullshit jobs”;49 
they relate to the widespread loss of faith in modern politics; to the confusion 
and fragmentation fostered by ‘post-truth’ phenomena; to the factional nature 
of populist discourse, and to the lack of coherence between the allegiances, 
ambitions and understandings of social actors that this involves; and indeed 
to more general and diffuse forms of scepticism towards the current social 
structure. Pippin’s work can, therefore, provide a useful framework for 
addressing the failings that engender the loss of meaning, disorientation and 
malaise that render the apparent answers and certainties provided by demagogic 
43  Pippin (2008), 6.
44  Pippin (2017), 340.
45  Pippin (2008). 5.
46  Pippin (2017), 342.
47  Pippin (2008), 5.
48  Pippin (2008), 5.
49  Graeber (2013). 
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rhetoric so appealing. 
 Now, there are limits to this applicability. Pippin says relatively little 
about why breakdowns and failures occur, and seems content simply to address 
Hegel’s own comments on the topic, and the philosophical questions of agency 
to which those comments give rise. He is, however, clearly of the view that 
these ideas may be relevant to contemporary society (hence his comments on 
Trump in his ‘Social Pathology’ essay, and his tendency to use examples drawn 
from modern life when illustrating his claims). If such a claim to relevance 
is to be persuasive, it must take account of the socio-economic structures at 
work within modern society. For if it does not do so, its account of normative 
breakdowns can become reducible to a commentary on the obstinacy and 
short-sightedness of the actors involved. In Pippin’s ‘Social Pathology’ essay, 
the “collective irrationalities”50 that led to Trump’s presidency are effectively 
reduced to a failure, on the part of a large portion of the American public, to 
really think and talk things through.51 In short, this approach needs to be applied 
to the specificities of capitalist social structures. After all, what is capitalist 
value, if not a set of norm-governed social practices? 
This points towards a line of further work, but one that I can do no more 
than suggest here. Pippin’s Hegel offers a means of thinking about the ways 
in which abstractions have ‘material’ force, insofar as they are rooted in, and 
shape, social conduct. In consequence, this is a form of Hegelian idealism 
that is not necessarily incompatible with the central premises of Marxian 
materialism.52 It may, therefore, be productive to read contemporary Marxian 
value-theory through something akin to Pippin’s approach to social activity. 
This is because such theory tends to stress the sense in which economic value 
is not just a mental construct, but rather the very architecture of our lived 
social relations. The scope of this essay means that this possibility needs to 
be put to one side. Suffice it to say here, however, that Pippin’s approach to 
social pathology requires some kind of socio-economic supplementation; and 
if Brown’s account of neoliberal social relations can serve as a place-holder 
50  Pippin (2017), 349.
51  Pippin (2017), 350.
52  Marx is frustratingly silent on the topic of the relation between concepts and reality (save, that 
is, for the second of the Theses on Feuerbach, which dismisses the issue as a “purely scholastic 
question” (Marx (1975), 423, emphasis in the original)). It seems safe to contend, however, that 
Marx’s materialism, according to which “the ideal is nothing but the real world reflected in the mind 
of man” (Marx (1990), 102), needs to be tempered with the observation that “the real world” is shaped 
through human actions that are themselves articulated by thought (Marx, we should remember, was 
not a crude determinist). Consequently, I would argue that a theory that understands social activity 
to be shaped and governed by normative concept-use need not be entirely incompatible with this 
‘materialism’. This is because such norms (those that structure economic practices, for example) may 
not be under the direct or conscious control of their adherents, and may merely form part of the 
unquestioned (and yet conceptually mediated) architecture of the social world. That ‘architecture’ 
composes the material circumstances in which social activity is played out. 
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for such supplementation, we can turn now to the way in which Pippin’s ideas 
might pertain to the nihilism that she associates with neoliberal subjectivity. 
Modern nihilism and the loss of the ‘Absolute’ 
According to Brown, neoliberalism breeds forms of individual comportment 
that are characterised not only by self-regulation, competitiveness, and desires 
for individual self-advancement, but also by neuroses, confusion, nihilism 
and malleability. This is held to have fostered the peculiar mixture of irony, 
spite and fierce, identitarian belief that often characterises the new far-right’s 
peculiarly hostile jouissance.53 When developing this part of her argument, she 
draws on Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism. She is, I think, right to do so: his 
conceptions of nihilism, angrily reactive ressentiment, and of the pliability of 
modern values, do indeed have clear echoes in modern politics. Brown does 
not, however, do a great deal more than signal these echoes, so I shall try to 
supplement her observations with the following remarks. 
Although Nietzsche is popularly understood as a proponent of modern 
nihilism, he was, as Brown acknowledges, one of its sharpest critics. Simply 
put, Nietzsche’s view was that, whilst God may well be dead (or: whilst the 
notion of a firm foundation for truth-claims, values and moral sentiments may 
have collapsed), modern society remained characterised by the values that he 
had once propped up. With that support knocked out, those values became 
hollow and empty of meaning.54 This, for Nietzsche, gave rise to both a great 
problem and a great possibility. On the one hand, this emptiness generated the 
vacancy and apathy of Zarathustra’s ‘last men’: individuals who have become 
as empty and baseless as the culture in which they reside. On the other hand, 
however, this same state of affairs had also led to a great insight: for once 
the scaffolding of traditional values was kicked away, it became all the more 
apparent, in Nietzsche’s view, that these values are based on nothing more 
solid than a ‘will to power’. But that insight does not entail nihilism. Instead, 
it amounts to a solution to the latter: for if this state of affairs is recognised, it 
becomes possible positively to embrace that foundational will, and to affirm the 
power of creation and liberation that it entails. This leads to the ‘transvaluation 
of all values’, the creative re-figuration of all extant moral and conceptual 
norms, that Nietzsche associated with the coming of the ‘Superman’ (a new, 
braver, and grander mode of existence).
Although Brown notes the salience of Nietzsche’s worries about nihilism, 
she does not address the aspects of his thought that I have summarised here. 
53  See Nagle 2017.
54  Nietzsche (2017), 11-13.
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Instead, she simply acknowledges his opposition to nihilism, and then moves 
on to connect his moral relativism to the fluidity of values within modern 
politics (“this phenomenon” of pliable values, she writes, “is ubiquitous”, and 
is “quotidian” in both “the instrumentalization of values for commercial and 
political gain”, and in “the general lack of umbrage at this instrumentalization”55). 
Having noted this loss of stable moral norms, she then links the joy that Nietzsche 
associated with the lack of moral restrictions to the grotesque, gleeful cruelty 
that often marks right-wing populism, particularly in its online manifestations. 
The latter connection is certainly persuasive (“to witness suffering does one 
good”, says Nietzsche, as there is “no festivity without cruelty”56), but what is 
missing from Brown’s account is the role played by the ‘death of God’ in his 
philosophy. This is important: for if one is to sustain the link between Nietzsche 
on the one hand, and modern nihilism on the other, then surely the primary 
issue is not simply the depthless flexibility of contemporary values, but rather 
the collapse of the anchor-points that once sustained them. 
On one level, we could fill this gap in Brown’s account by pointing to her 
own comments concerning the erosion of the traditional status of the white 
male, and more specifically, to the falling economic significance and power 
of the white male worker: “undone by offshored factory jobs, disappearing 
affordable housing, and unprecedented global movements of labour and capital, 
the age of the secure white male provider and nation-state sovereignty in the 
Global North is finished”.57 Yet whilst the status of the white male patriarch has 
weakened, many of the social norms that correspond to that status remain in 
place, even though they have started to seem increasingly hollow. A connection 
could be drawn here to Nietzsche’s dead God that would fit neatly with the 
ironic, self-deprecating dimensions of alt-right misogyny. On another, broader, 
level, however, this same idea also pertains to the ways in which neoliberal 
restructuring has dissolved the older reference points of class, community, 
and historical orientation. The “God” that has been vanquished in this sense is 
not the white patriarch, but rather the cohesion and functionality of collective 
subjectivity per se. Or, to put this in the terms of Pippin’s interpretation of 
Hegel: the God that is missing – or has been occluded and undermined – is 
nothing less than the Absolute.
 On a traditional, full-blown metaphysical reading of Hegel, the 
Absolute is the fundamental rational architecture and driving-force of all 
being (and ‘being’, in this sense, means nothing less than the totality of the 
cosmos). It is, in effect, a pantheistic ‘God’. On Pippin’s account, however, the 
Absolute has a much smaller remit. It is not the structure of being per se, but 
55  Brown (2018), 70.
56  Nietzsche (1996), 48.
57  Brown (2018), 69.
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rather the conceptual structure through which Spirit constructs and conceives 
intelligible being. This means that Spirit’s final knowledge of the Absolute is 
not the identification of a distinct entity or a fact. Instead, it is reason’s full 
“understanding … of its own activity”.58 Such knowledge is not, therefore, “the 
achievement of some sort of first-order truth about what there is”: instead, it is 
“our self-conscious justification of the possibility of any first-order truths about 
the world”.59 It is not a final account of everything, but rather a full account 
of the structure of any possible account-giving.60 To know the Absolute, then, 
is to grasp the conceptual mechanics that underpin any instance of collective 
subjectivity (or rather Spirit), i.e. that articulate the shared norms through 
which the latter operates. 
This means that there is no final arrest or Kojèveian “end of history” on this 
reading of Hegel.61 All we have here is the identification and comprehension 
of a structure that is, Pippin tells, us, in constant, open-ended, self-constitutive 
and self-determinate movement (it is a “self-consciousness about …[the] 
process” of Spiritual life, Pippin writes, and not an acknowledgement of the 
latter’s “final completion or termination”).62 In consequence, rather than a 
perspective on a completed past, we instead have a concern with construction 
of the future.63 Now, such a structure can never truly ‘die’, in the Nietzschean 
sense, as it must remain implicit in all forms of social and practical concept-
use. It can, however, be poorly actualised through flawed and irrational forms 
of social interaction. If that occurs, we end up with a situation in which the 
values, commitments, and normative practices of a social order fragment: 
they lose their coherence, and fail to afford meaningful self-determinacy 
for the actors involved. This echoes the Nietzschean idea of modernity’s 
baseless, fragmented, and empty values, but it implies a rather different, 
albeit somewhat similar, response – not the affirmation of the will to power’s 
58  Pippin (1989), 70.
59  Pippin (2007), 59-60.
60  See Pippin (1989),247 and 257. Or, to put this in more Witgensteinian terms: the Absolute, on 
this reading, is something like the structure of all possible language-games; a structure, moreover, that 
can only be understood from within such games.
61  The common conception of the notorious Hegelian ‘end of history’ stems from the work of 
Alexandre Kojève. During the 1930s, Kojève presented an enormously influential series of seminars 
on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit at the École Pratique des Hautes Études. These seminars were 
attended by some of the major figures in French twentieth century thought (e.g. Aron, Breton, Bataille, 
Lacan and Merleau-Ponty), and they greatly informed the Francophone reception of Hegel’s ideas. In 
addition to fostering a focus on the Phenomenology, they advanced the idea that Hegel had, in effect, 
announced the end of history itself. The textual evidence for such a view is scant: Hegel refers to the 
“end of history” only once in his entire corpus. The phrase appears in a work that was composed, 
posthumously, from Hegel’s lecture notes and from his students’ own notes; and even there it only 
functions as part of a metaphor (Hegel (2004), 103).  Remarks concerning the ‘openness’ of the 
future, or at least concerning the need for further historical work to be performed, can also be found 
elsewhere in his writings (see Stewart 1996 for useful commentary). 
62  Pippin (1989), 247.
63  This is central to the argument presented in (and thus the predicament described in) Pippin 2003.
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creative potential, but rather the creation, through the norms of collective 
self-determinacy, of a shared future.64  
I have argued that the loss, or occlusion, of such a future is the pathology that 
underpins a great deal of modern demagogic politics. I shall close by looking at 
a particularly extreme illustration of this point: namely, the demagogic rhetoric 
of the new far-right, as advanced by some of the latter’s prominent theorists. 
Their rhetoric can, I think, serve to illustrate the relevance of both Brown’s 
emphasis on particularisation and the Hegelian loss of meaning and direction 
that I outlined earlier. This is because their particular version of demagogy is 
itself a flawed, symptomatic response to the problems identified by both Brown 
and Pippin. On the one hand, it reflects, and serves to channel, the anger and 
disillusionment bred by the particularisation that Brown describes. On the other, 
it offers palliative answers to such frustrations; answers that correctly identify a 
broader collapse of meaning and purpose, but which respond to that collapse by 
affirming the comforting but illusory sureties of tradition, nation, and biological 
identity, rather than by endorsing any kind of collective, universal orientation 
towards the future. 
One of the peculiarities of the new Right is the degree to which it 
sometimes echoes, however inadvertently, the so-called ‘identity politics’ and 
criticisms of universalism that have been associated with the theoretical Left 
for the past several decades. This follows from its hostility to a globalised and 
purportedly multicultural (neo-)liberal order, and from its readiness to assert 
the authenticity of national and ethnic identity in opposition to such marketised 
cosmopolitanism. In France, for example, Alain de Benoist has claimed that the 
abstract universalism commonly associated with the European Enlightenment 
“is the basis of all totalitarianisms”, and that such “homogenising universalism 
is only the projection and the mask of an ethnocentrism extended over the 
whole planet”;65 likewise, in Russia, Aleksandr Dugin can be found claiming 
that the assertion of purportedly universal values is really “a form of ideological 
expression against a multiplicity of cultures”.66 Against the abstract universality 
that they associate with those values, writers such as these affirm the importance 
of qualitative particularity and identity, albeit understood in terms of ethnos, 
nation and race.67 I would argue that the rhetoric and appeal of demagogic 
theorists such as these accords with Brown’s account of neoliberalism’s 
degeneration of the social, and with her claims concerning the ways in which 
64  Mark Fisher’s insightful comments on neoliberal society’s inability to think the future are highly 
relevant here (see, for example, Fisher 2014)  
65  de Benoist and Champetier, undated 
66  Dugin (2018), 193.
67  Dugin, for example, understands “ethnos” as a “community of language, religion belief” and 
“daily life” (Dugin (2018), 47); similarly, Guillaume Faye has called for a revitalisation of “the values 
of the arché”, and for “a folk community founded on the law of blood, culture and memory” (Faye 
(2010), 75).
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the privatisation of the social produces modes of subjectivity that are inclined 
to express unrest through the reactive assertion of particularity. This feeds, and 
is fed by, the demagogic presentation of reactive and confusedly particularistic 
images of the meaning and orientation once afforded by the sociality that 
neoliberalism has steadily effaced. The nature of that particularisation fosters 
conservative retrospection (nation, tradition, heritage, etc.). Yet what is really 
missing, according to the perspective that I have tried to outline here, is an 
orientation towards the future. The difficult solution implied by Pippin’s 
conception of social pathology, at least as I have employed it here, is to pursue 
such an orientation through the creation of structures and forms of interaction 
that differ from the empty universality of marketised equivalence, and that 
run counter to the antagonistic and essentialist particularity that characterises 
demagogic reactions to this malaise. Seen in these terms, then, modern 
demagogy can be understood as a symptom of a set of pathologically flawed 
social relations.
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